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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
MACH AND THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICA nON 
THOMAS MANIG 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
Scholars of the history of the philosophy of science take it pretty much 
for iSranted that the scientist Ernst Mach had created much of the initial 
thrust if not many of the central principles of logical positivism. And for the 
most part they are quite right in thinking so. Although, as Toulmin aptly put 
it, 'Mach himself was never a "logical" positivist,' Mach's radically empiricis-
tic and anti-metaphysical orientation was sufficient to justify the feelings of 
indebtedness most early logical positivists had for him. Indeed, the first 
manifesto of the so-called "Vienna Circle" oflogical positivists was published 
by the Viennese Ernst Mach Society, a group headed by Moritz Schlick, the 
acknowledged founder of logical positivism. This manifesto announced that 
the Vienna Circle, in seeking 'to eliminate metaphysical problems and 
assertions as meaningless as well as to clarify the meanings of concepts and 
sentences of empirical science by showing their immediately observable 
content ... continues the endeavors initiated by Ernst Mach.' 
Some of the central principles of logical positivism, such as the doctrine 
of the unity of science, are easy to extract from Mach's written works. But 
Mach was a little more cautious about stating anything quite as bold as the 
principle with which we will now be primarily concerned, namely, the 
Principle of Verification. In its fullest generality, the Principle of Verification 
is the principle that a statement or proposition is meaningful if, and only if, it 
is either analytically true or empirically verifiable. (The analytically true ones, 
thought of as true come what may, are thus verified by any evidence 
whatsoever.) While Mach is certainly responsible for less extreme statements 
about the merits of empirical verification, he primarily regarded himself as a 
scientist trying to cleanse science of metaphysical muddles, and not as a 
philosopher trying to demarcate the whole realm of meaningful statements or 
propositions. It is one thing to say that metaphysical statements are 
physically meaningless, and quite another thing to say that they are 
meaningless simpliciter. As the rising philosopher Corbin Fowler has pointed 
out, 'Physical propositions are meaningless from a metaphysical point of 
view.' 
Throughout Mach's works, one gets the impression that Mach had 
intended only to keep metaphysical considerations out of science. Apparently 
he didn't care very much whether or not metaphysical considerations had a 
meaningful place outside of science. Rather, he had declared 'I do not share 
the Kantian point of view, in fact, occupy flO metaphysical point of view, not 
even that of Berkeley.' If we respect this declaration, we must regard Mach's 
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hostile attitude toward metaphysics as a scientist's attitude, and not as a 
philosopher's doctrine about what is wrong with metaphysics pcr sc. Mach 
never attacked metaphysics on the presumption that whatever is unempirical 
or unscientific must be meaningless in all contexts, but only on the 
presumption that metaphysical considerations are alien to the central 
character of empirical science. The tenet that dominates Mach's discussions of 
this character is that 'Economy of communication and of apprehension is of 
the very essence of science.' Thus, scientific laws are merely highly 
economical means of describing and communicating our sensory experiences. 
(Since sensory experiences can be sorted out in any of various ways, Mach 
argued that the compartmentalization of sciences into various special sciences 
is arbitrary. Hence his doctrine of the unity of science.) 
Metaphysical considerations get ruled out of science because they are 
contrary to science's fundamentally economical character with respect to OUr 
sensory experiences. For metaphysical items correspond to no features of 
sensory experiences that we would ever need to communicate; mentioning 
such items would just detract from the efficient reporting of experiences. The 
trouble with the Newtonian conception of absolute time, for example, is that 
it 'can be measured by comparison with no motion; it has therefore neither a 
practical nor a scientific value; and no one is justified in saying that he knows 
aught about it. It is an idle metaphysical conception.' (Fasten on the word 
'idle'. ) 
Mach characterized empirical science with a particular epistemology in 
mind, and it is noteworthy that his hostility toward metaphysics did not 
extend to epistemology. His epistemology is partly expressed in the following 
passage: 
All our principles of mechanics are, as we have shown in detail, experimental 
knowledge concerning the relative positions and motions of bodies. Even in the 
provinces in which they are now recognized as valid, they could not (be), and were 
not, admitted without previously being subjected to experimental tests. No one is 
warranted in extending these principles beyond the boundaries of experience. In 
fact, such an extension is meaningless, as no one possesses the requisite knowledge 
to make use of it. 
In this passage one detects a radical restriction of mechanics to empirical 
principles. It was one of Mach's main tenets that laws of n~tural science are 
empirical, and he frequently went out of his way to undermine apriorism in 
mechanics, especially as it was manifested in the classical physical concep· 
tions of mass, inertia, absolute space, absolute time and causality. 
Again, what goes wrong with principles which invoke such a priori 
conceptions, and what made Mach say that such principles are meaningless, is 
that insofar as they are extended beyond the boundaries of experience they 
lose their usefulness. For instance, any law of inertia which purports to 
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describe the motion of a body which is unaffected by external forces, 
purports to describe a situation we could never experience and is to that 
extent useless. And casual laws which purport to describe anything other than 
functional connections between sensory experiences likewise purport to 
describe something we could never experience, and are likewise rendered 
useless in that respect. 
We've been concentrating on Mach's two tenets that the laws of natural 
science are empirical and that metaphysical considerations are alien to the 
central character of science because these tenets have frequently, and 
appropriately, been held in conjunction with the Principle of Verification, yet 
they must not be regarded as sufficient to commit one to the Principle of 
Verification. In short, the fact that Mach held these two tenets does not by 
itself imply his commitment to the Principle of Verification. It is true that 
both of the tenets are anti-metaphysical in their source and aim, but their 
force is simply to rule that metaphysical considerations are not scientific 
considerations. The Principle of Verification, on the other hand, is the 
stronger claim that metaphysical propositions or statements don't make any 
sense at all, even in non-scientific contexts. Implicit in the desire to 
implement the Principle of Verification is the idea that science constitutes the 
paradigm case of meaningful discourse. 
Of course Mach has powerful tendencies in that direction, too, but these 
tendencies couldn't really be interpreted as central tenets of Mach's. For 
example, in the Science of Mechanics, Mach did conjecture that physical 
science would eventually develop into a complete world view, but this was 
certainly much more conjecture than conviction; even if it were one of 
Mach's tenets, it would have been relatively minor. It is likely that Mach 
would have liked to believe that science constitutes the paradigm case of 
meaningful discourse, but it is equally likely that he realized that he had 
insufficient grounds for such a belief. 
Wittgenstein and the early logical positivists incorporated various facets 
of Mach's thought into their own, but not without considerable revision and 
refinement. In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein incorporated Mach's empirical 
atomism - the idea that all empirical knowledge is founded upon elementary 
sensory units. Following Wittgenstein in their emphasis upon language, but 
going beyond Wittgenstein in their exploration of idealized formal languages, 
the Vienna Circle positivists sought to make Mach's positivism logical. Carnap 
varied a Machian theme by requiring that logical constructions be substituted 
for inferred entities wherever possible, for Mach had required the replacement 
of such inferred entities as casual connections by such abstract instruments as 
mathematical functions. Indeed, Mach's views concerning inferred entities 
nay be neatly characterized as an instrumentalism which implies nothing 
lbout the entities' reality. For Mach, an inferred entity could only be 
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properly introduced into a scientific theory as an instrument for economizing 
description and communication; and, although Mach excluded metaphysical 
posits from science on those grounds, he did not insist that they are also to be 
excluded from extrascientific contexts on those grounds. 
Mach did endorse antimetaphysical views of less scope than the 
full-fledged principle of verification; and to this extent he was a pioneer of 
verificationist positivism. But the most fair assessment of his stated views is 
that he never arrived in the Promised Land. He never sought to create a 
scientific world-view which encompassed all and only empirically meaningful 
discourse. Again and again, he would attack the use of a metaphYSical 
principle or concept on the grounds that it was scientifically meaningless, but 
never on the grounds that it was meaningless in all contexts. It is easy to 
confuse this viewpoint of Mach's with his other claim that the principles of 
science are indeed, wholly meaningless when removed from their empirical 
life blood. Thus, Mach had been saying that metaphysical principles are 
merely scientifically out of place, whereas scientific principles alienated from 
experience are unconditionally out of place. We might well conclude that 
Mach, dedicated scientist that he was, didn't care one way or another about 
metaphysics' extrascientific status. What primarily justified his heavy influ-
ence on the logical positivists was his conjecture that physical science would 
eventually develop into a comprehensive world-view. 
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